Mitigating Coordinated Call Attacks On VoIP Networks Using Hidden Markov Model by Nakorji, Usman Haruna et al.
Cite: Nakorji, U., Adedokun, E., Umoh, I., & Shettima, A. (2019). Mitigating Coordinated Call Attacks On VoIP Networks Using Hidden Markov 
Model. Kinetik: Game Technology, Information System, Computer Network, Computing, Electronics, and Control, 4(4). 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/kinetik.v4i4.797 
Kinetik: Game Technology, Information System, Computer Network, Computing, Electronics, and Control 
Journal homepage: http://kinetik.umm.ac.id  
ISSN: 2503-2267  
Vol. 4, No. 3, August 2019, Pp. 277-288 4 November 2019, Pp. 337-344 
    








Usman H. Nakorji *1, E. A Adedokun 2, I. J. Umoh 3, Abdullazeez Shettima4 
Ahmad Bello University, Nigeria1,2,3,4 
 
Article Info Abstract 
Keywords:  
Coordinated Call Attack, VoIP, Short Term 
Energy, Hidden Markov Model, Call Interaction 
Pattern, Call Activities Detection 
 
Article history: 
Received 22 March 2019  
Revised 25 June 2019 
Accepted 31 July 2019 
Published 30 October 2019 
 
Cite:  
Nakorji, U., Adedokun, E., Umoh, I., & 
Shettima, A. (2019). Mitigating Coordinated 
Call Attacks On VoIP Networks Using Hidden 
Markov Model. Kinetik: Game Technology, 
Information System, Computer Network, 




Usman H. Narkoji 
E-mail address:  
harry14ng@gmail.com 
This paper presents a 2-tier scheme for mitigating coordinated call attacks on 
VoIP networks. Call interaction pattern was considered using talk and salient 
periods in a VoIP call conversation. At the first-tier, Short Term Energy 
algorithm was used for call interaction feature extraction and at the second-tier 
Hidden Markov Model was used for caller legitimacy recognition. Data of VoIP 
call conversations were collated and analyzed to extract distinctive features in 
VoIP call interaction pattern to ascertain the legitimacy of a caller against 
coordinated call attacker. The performance metrics that was used are; False 
Error Rate (FER), Specificity, Detection Accuracy and Throughput. Several 
experiments were conducted to see how effective the mitigating scheme is, as 
the scheme acts as a proxy server to Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server. 
The experiments show that; when the VoIP server is under coordinated call 
attack without a mitigating scheme only 15.2% of legitimate VoIP users had 
access to the VoIP network and out of which about half of the legitimate users 
had their calls dropped before completion, while with the 2-tier mitigating 
scheme, when the VoIP server is under coordinated call attacks over 90.3% 
legitimate VoIP callers had their calls through to completion. 
  
1. Introduction 
Voice over Internet Protocol is a cost-effective and very efficient application for audio-visual communication 
businesses, this makes VoIP services prone to several attacks [1]. Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS) attack is a type 
of Denial of Service attack that target telephone services, like VoIP services, denying legitimate users access to the 
VoIP services [2]. These attacks are usually carried out during call transmission by disallowing honest users access to 
the VoIP service, example of aforesaid attacks are SIP flooding attack and VoIP amplification attack [3]. They are usually 
achieved by generating immense number of calls at an instance and direct the large traffic through its targeted VoIP 
server, these attack patterns can easily be detected by network administrators and by placing a good monitoring tool 
that analyses the network flow and whenever there is unusual increase in traffic it activated the mitigating tool to block 
IPs [4].   
There is a current category of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack known as Application- Layer Distributed 
Denial of Service attack (ADDoS), this recent form of DDoS attacks can bypass the traditional mitigating systems that 
only monitors unusual increase in network traffic then block the IPs of the unusual traffics [5]. ADDoS is a kind of attack 
that is not actualized over the network layer, but across application layer [6]. This means that the ADDoS attacker can 
aim at a specific application of its target server, while other applications are running, thereby generating less traffic and 
making the attacker very difficult to detect [6]. This is possible because the attacker generates very similar traffic to that 
of a legitimate user [1]. Here are types of ADDoS attacks namely; POST attack, Slowread attack, Slowloris attack, 
attacks exploiting protocols used by HTTP and then Coordinated Call attack that target VoIP services [7]. 
This research focused on mitigating Coordinated Call attack. Coordinated Call attack is conducted when two 
attackers that are equally registered to VoIP system pair up and put a call to each other, through a targeted VoIP server 
and then stay on calling state and remains in the state for as long as possible thereby exhausting the victim’s VoIP 
server resources [8]. It is known that VoIP servers allocate resources to each call, therefore by using several pairs of 
call channels simultaneously, they can take down a target VoIP network by exhausting resources of the server since 
each VoIP server has a number concurrent calls it can take at a time [9]. 
Coordinated Call attack is relatively a new attack, there are not many studies on how to mitigate them, while there 
is abundance of traffic data for DDoS at Network layer targeting VoIP services to work with, such as; CAIDA databases, 
UNINA database and KDD Cup database, the case is different for Coordinated Call attack (ADDoS).   
At call interaction features extraction stage, Short Term Energy (STE) was computed by breaking the signal of 
voice into frames of 𝑀 samples and then computed the total squared values of the samples within each frame [10]. This 
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breaking of the audio signal was attained by the use of a right window function to split the voice signal into required 
frames [11]. 
While at call interaction pattern recognition state, Hidden Markov Model (HMM) was trained with extracted 
features from STE module. This enables the HMM to drop coordinated call attackers calls as perceived. These HMMs 
contain transition distribution state, observation state and initial distribution state [12].    
Diverse types of approach were used to mitigate DDoS attack aiming VoIP systems [13][14][15]. They built their 
mitigation system to analyze network traffic flow into the VoIP server and when a large and unusual traffic is detected, 
the system activates its defense mechanism. A selective strategy was developed to mitigate Coordinated Call attacks 
on VoIP servers. This mitigated the attack effectively, but it was clouded by huge number of drop calls. Hence, the 
contribution of this research is: 
1. To develop a Short Term Energy (STE) Scheme for mitigating Coordinated Call Attacks on VoIP networks based on 
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) called STEHMM. 
2. To simulate STEHMM used for classification of callers on VoIP server when under coordinated call attack using 
Java. 
3. To design a scheme that works perfectly with VoIP SIP server 
4. To select call parameters that will reduce number of drop calls to its barest minimum in the course of mitigating 
coordinated call attack on VoIP network.   
 
2. Research Method 
 
               STE/HMM















Figure 1. Experimental VoIP Network Architecture 
 
Figure 1 above is the experimental VoIP network architecture used to mitigate coordinated call attack and to test 
the effectiveness of the developed STEHMM. When a VoIP call is put through Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server 
through the STEHMM server as a proxy as shown in Figure 1 above, the STEHMM server consists of two tiers which 
are: call feature extraction tier which is handled by Short Term Energy (STE) algorithm and call feature pattern 
recognition tier which is handled by Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Data of VoIP call conversations were collated and 
analyzed to get distinctive features for legitimate caller, coordinated calls, attacker’s calls and robot or pre-recorded 
calls see Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. A Snippet of 30 Secs Legitimate Call Interaction Waveform 
 
Table 1. Extracted Features and Parameter Weights For 30 secs Frame of 5secs Window Call Interaction 
Windows 5secs 10secs 15secs 20secs 25secs 30secs 
Weights 0.06, 0.05 
0.15, 
0.14 
0.18 0.02 0.06 0.15 
Call interaction 
features 
𝑠6, 𝑠1 𝑠2, 𝑠5 𝑠3 𝑠4 𝑠6 𝑠2 
 
 
Figure 3. A Snippet of 30 Secs CCA Call Interaction Waveform 
 
Table 2. Extracted Features and Parameter Weights for 30secs Frame of 5secs Window Call Interaction 













𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠2, 𝑠3, 𝑠4, 𝑠2, 𝑠1, 𝑠2 𝑠1,𝑠2 
 
 
Figure 4. A Snippet 30secs Robot Call Interaction Waveform  
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Table 3. Extracted Features and Parameter Weights for 30secs Frame of 5secs Window Call Interaction 
Windows 5secs 10secs 15secs 20secs 25secs 30secs 




𝑠1 𝑠1 𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠1 𝑠2 𝑠2 
 
The above, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 were repeated for attacker’s call 
interaction pattern and for a pre-recorded VoIP call and the following features were extracted and their corresponding 
STE weights. Features from VoIP call conversation between party A and B was considered, the feature are; A talking 
and B is silent (AT/BS), A silent and B is talking (AS/BT), Mutual silence where A spoke last (MS/AL), Mutual silence 
where B spoke last (MS/BL), Double talk where A interrupted (DT/AI) and Double talk where B interrupted (DT/BI) which 
are represented as 𝑠1 𝑠2 𝑠3 𝑠4 𝑠5 and 𝑠6 respectively. The corresponding STE 𝐸𝑛 for 𝑠1 to 𝑠6 were taken using the 
Equation 1.  
 




        
Where 𝐸𝑛  represents the nth frame of Energy for the voice activity signal as 𝑥(𝑚) denotes amplitude for the 
voice activity signals in time domain and 𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑚) is the window function where the samples are. The energy 𝐸𝑛 of 
each identified call interaction pattern is calculated for every 5secs hamming window within each 30secs frame for each 
pattern 𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑠𝑖) of VoIP call conversation [11]. The energy is calculated, such that, when a pattern is identified within 
a window it drops the calculation of that particular energy and calculates the next pattern to avoid loop of recalculating 
an already identified pattern the corresponding STE are tabulated on Table 4. 
    
Table 4. STE Weight Values Assigned to Call Interaction Parameters 
SN Simulation Parameter Weight (Joules) 
1 𝑠1 0.05 
2 𝑠2 0.15 
3 𝑠3 0.18 
4 𝑠4 0.02 
5 𝑠5 0.14 
6 𝑠6 0.06 
 
The STE weights in Table 4 were further used to train three HMM models that were developed, of the three HMM 
models, one has combination of  𝑠1 to 𝑠6 representing legitimate caller, the second HMM has combination of 𝑠1 to 𝑠4 
representing coordinated call attacker caller and the third HMM has combination of only 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 for robot caller, these 
are schematically represented on Figure 5. 
 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 5. HMM Model Call Interaction Pattern Recognition (a) HMM for Legitimate Caller (b) HMM for CCA Attack 
Caller (c) HMM for Pre-Recorded Caller 
 
Asterisk 13.6.0 was used for call management, 50 callers maximum was set, When the VoIP server is saturated, 
that is, incoming calls are unable to complete the call initiation process and kept in WAITING or USER BUSY mode, 
which signifies the VoIP server has attained its 50 calls bound, the scenario where VoIP server is under CCA attack, 
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out of the 50 calls it was observed that 60% of the calls ongoing are legitimate callers and 30% are illegitimate callers 
and 10% were robot callers, which was our initial prior in HMM 𝑃(𝑥0) = {0.6, 0.3, 0.1}. The table below contains the 
energy weights for the six talk interaction patterns deduced from VoIP call conversation, the weights are chosen from 
the STE waveforms of each talk interaction pattern. These patterns as extracted are represented as; 𝑠1 𝑠2 𝑠3 𝑠4 𝑠5 and 
𝑠6, with weights attached to patterns in joules as obtained from the collated VoIP call conversations which are then 
compared to the observation state of HMM model 𝐵{𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3}  to determine the hidden states 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3. The HMM 
parameters as defined for caller identity below 
 
Where HMM is Equation 2. 
 




  𝜋 =   𝒙𝟏     𝒙𝟐    𝒙𝟑  




the above 𝜋 is the initial distribution state. 
 
𝑃(𝑋𝑡|𝑋𝑡−1) =    
𝑷(𝒙|𝒚) 𝒚𝟏 𝒚𝟐 𝒚𝟑 𝒚𝟒 𝒚𝟓 𝒚𝟔 
𝒙𝟏 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
𝒙𝟐 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 
𝑥3 0.6 0.4 0 0 0 0 
 
1 ≤ 𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 6  
 
The table above is the transition distribution state 𝐴. 
 
𝐵𝑖 =   
𝑷(𝒙|𝒚) 𝒚𝟏 𝒚𝟐 𝒚𝟑 𝒚𝟒 𝒚𝟓 𝒚𝟔 
𝒙𝟏 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 
𝒙𝟐 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0 0 
𝒙𝟑 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Finally,  𝐵 is the observation state distribution that allow transition amongst states. The tucker conditions for the 
HMM models 𝜆 dropping attacker’s call as perceived is given as. 
 
𝑓(𝜆) =  {
𝑥1,  𝑖𝑓 0.5 ≥ 𝑦1 ≤ 0.6
  𝑥2, 𝑖𝑓  0.2 ≥ 𝑦2 ≤ 0.3
𝑥3, 𝑖𝑓 0.05 ≥ 𝑦3 ≤ 0.1
 
 
                     
3. Results and Discussion 
This paper used asterisk server which is predominantly used for small and medium scale businesses. The 
maximum concurrent calls were set to 50 callers, the 50 calls were varied at ratios; 10:40 calls, 20:30 calls, 30:20 calls 
and 40:10 calls of coordinated call attackers to honest VoIP users to observe the effect of the attack at each ratio. Three 
experiments were conducted, the initial experiment was conducted with VoIP server under coordinated call attack 
without using any mitigation scheme, the second experiment carried out was when the VoIP server is under coordinated 
call attack and using STEHMM to mitigate it and lastly, when the VoIP server is not under coordinated attack with 
STEHMM.  
The experiment conducted when the VoIP server was under coordinated call attack without using STEHMM to 
mitigate shows that only 15.2% of VoIP users were able to make call through the VoIP server. 30.1% of the those who 
had their calls through got their calls terminated before call completion. 
The second experiment conducted when the VoIP server is under Coordinated call attacks and using STEHMM 
for mitigation shows STEHMM mitigated coordinated call attack effectively. This is due to the fact that 90.3% VoIP 
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callers had access to the VoIP server. However, out of the 90.3% about 8.2% users had their calls terminated before 
they could complete their calls. 
The last experiment was carried out to see the burden STEHMM has on the already overburdened VoIP network. 
STEHMM has no negative effect on the VoIP network, this is because as soon as coordinated call attack is mitigated 
STEHMM goes to passive mode to save the network resources.   
The bar chart in the figure below shows the experimental results of the first sets of experiment conducted to see 
the effect of coordinated call attack on VoIP networks before applying a mitigation scheme. 
 
 
Figure 6. VoIP User Success Rate When Under CCA Without Mitigation 
  
The bar chart in the Figure 6 above shows that, when a VoIP server is under coordinated call attack without using 
a mitigation scheme only 15.2% of the legitimate VoIP users had access to VoIP server while 30.1% of them had their 
calls terminated before completion. 
The bar chart in the Figure 7 below shows the experimental results of the second sets of experiment conducted 
to see the effect of STEHMM on VoIP networks when under coordinated call attack. 
 
 
Figure 7. VoIP User Success Rate When Under CCA and Running STEHMM  
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The bar chart in the Figure 7 above shows that, when a VoIP server is under coordinated call attack with using 
and its using STEHMM as mitigation scheme, shows that 90.3% of honest users had access for the VoIP server 
resources. However, 8.75% of them had their calls terminated before they could complete their calls. 
The bar chart in the Figure 8 below shows the experimental results of the third sets of experiment conducted to 
see the effect of STEHMM on VoIP networks when it is not under coordinated call attack. 
 
 
Figure 8. VoIP User Success Rate When Not Under CCA and Running STEHMM 
 
The bar chart in the figure above shows that, when a VoIP server is not under coordinated call attack but using 
STEHMM as its mitigating scheme, it does not have any effect of the server resources, no unsuccessful calls.  
 
3.1 Performance Evaluation   
The performance evaluations were carefully selected considering VoIP network traffic. False Error Rate (FER), 
Specificity and throughput were used for performance evaluation to further prove the efficiency of STEHMM. FER was 
computed using the Equation 3. 
 





Where ℓ𝑆𝑇 is the number honest VoIP users mistakenly identified as coordinated call attackers while µ𝑇 is the 







Where 𝐿𝑆𝑇 is the total coordinated call attackers’ call identified by STEHMM, while µ𝑇 is the total number of calls 
handled by STEHMM. Throughput was also computed to know the effect of STEHMM on VoIP networks using the 
Equation 5. 
 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 =  
𝛼𝑆𝑇
β𝑆𝑇
 𝑋 100 (5) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑆𝑇 is the total number of calls handled by STEHMM while β𝑆𝑇 is the total number of incoming VoIP calls 
handled by VoIP server. 
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The Table 5 below presents that FER test of STEHMM is 6.25% on the average of the four experiments carried 
out, that is, when attacker to legitimate calls are varied for 10:40, 20:30, 30:20 and 40:10 respectively. For Specificity 
test and Throughput, STEHMM outperformed well by 93.2%, and 3.58% respectively. 
 
Table 5. Performance Evaluation  
  FER SPECIFICITY THROUGHPUT 
Tests FER test (%) Specificity test (%) Throughput test (%) 
Percentage 
Improvement (%) 
6.25 93.2 3.58 
 
4. Conclusion 
From the results displayed it shows that without any mitigating scheme, if the VoIP server is under coordinated 
call attack only 15.2% of honest VoIP users had access to the VoIP system and 30.1% of them had their calls terminated 
before call completion. When the developed scheme STEHMM was used to mitigate coordinated call attack 90.3% 
honest callers had full access to the VoIP server. This signifies the mitigating scheme worked effectively. However, 
STEHMM is far from being perfect, for further improvement, call classification can be improved upon using source cell 
identification of every VoIP caller waveform and incorporating callers’ classification into gold, silver and bronze users 
based on origin of request IP and history of users’ call can improve the precision of the developed scheme. 
 
Notation 
𝑠𝑖 : Call interaction pattern between two parties. 
ℓ𝑆𝑇 : Number honest VoIP users mistakenly identified. 
µ𝑇 : The total number of calls handled by STEHMM. 
𝛼𝑆𝑇 : Total number of calls handled by STEHMM. 
β𝑆𝑇 : Total number of incoming VoIP calls.  
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